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Abstract
As the technology to secure information improves, hackers will employ less technical means
to get access to unauthorized data. The use of Social Engineering as a non tech method of
hacking has been increasingly used during the past few years. There are different types of
social engineering methods reported but what is lacking is a unifying effort to understand
these methods in the aggregate. This paper aims to classify these methods through taxonomy
so that organizations can gain a better understanding of these attack methods and accordingly
be vigilant against them.
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1.0 Introduction
The term ‘social engineering’ is found to have its roots from the early 20th century political
science field where it meant to represent smart methods that solve the social problems. Due to
the positive connotations of the word ‘engineering’ it was appropriated for various social
problems of the time. Karl Popper, in his book endorsed the idea as sense of social change
based on well established instrumental knowledge (Hansson, 2006). Over the years,
especially after the World War II the term gained a more negative flavour and was associated
with the stereotyped designs employed by politicians to gain electoral advantage (Duff,
2005). Today the negativity of the term still persists but has gained usage in field of
Information Systems Security to describe cases where people are persuaded to furnish
critical information that should otherwise remain private (Hansson, 2006). This involves a
gamut of things like revealing passwords, providing access to the organization’s internal
infrastructure etc.; the concept has gained a lot attention over the recent years as a potent
attack vector primarily because of the disastrous consequences it can cause.
There has been a considerable increase in the number of research papers that studied this
topic which is enough evidence that social engineering has attained academic significance.
The literature provides studies on different methods of social engineering attacks through
various case studies. Laribee (Laribee, 2006) suggests taxonomy to classify these attacks
based on three broad criteria ‘close access techniques’ ‘online social engineering’ and
intelligence gathering. However, the list of different attack vectors that especially fall under
online social engineering is not updated and ‘information gathering’ as we will have
discussed below is not strictly unique to social engineering. In another study David Harley
(Harley, 1998) suggests of a taxonomy that lists a few social engineering attacks but we feel
it lacks the clarity and comprehensibility required for a good taxonomy. A taxonomy is
required when it is necessary to provide a clear and consistent overview of a phenomenon
without any obvious overlap (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). A good taxonomy is the one that is
mutually exclusive, unambiguous and comprehensive and comprehensible (Lindqvist &
Jonsson, 1997) and the aim of this paper is to provide a taxonomy for social engineering
attacks in line with these requirements.

The paper starts by introducing the nature and impact of social engineering attacks in
Sections 2 & 3. Section 4 lays the groundwork for the taxonomy by describing the anatomy
of a social engineering attack, and finally Section 5 discusses the new proposed taxonomy by
describing each type of attack vector and the reasons why it falls under a particular category.
Section 6 briefly discusses possible countermeasures to mitigate the effect of these attacks
and finally we conclude the paper with Section 7 by discussing the potential of this taxonomy
and future research directions.

2.0 Nature of social engineering attacks
There are many interpretations and definitions of the term available throughout the literature.
Though the exact wording of most of the available definitions varies, the common essence
that emanates from each of them is that social engineering involves methods that can control
human behaviour to one’s objective utility. It is generally accepted that the main chink in the
armour of any organization’s security architecture is the people of the organization and that is
where that attack starts (Barber, 2001; Barrett, 2003; Mitnick & Simon, 2003). A social
engineer can control the victim’s behaviour usually by evoking strong human emotions. The
usual route is that the attacker weaves a plausible story in order to bag the trust of his victim.
The story commonly used in such situations is filled with basic human instincts like greed,
sympathy or fear (Townsend, 2010). The way in which attackers gain such trust is by
persistently persuading the victim to connect to these emotions. Rusch mentions two ways of
persuading an individual: (1) through sound analytical reasoning called ‘central route to
persuasion’ or (2) through eliciting emotions called ‘peripheral route to persuasion’
(Thornburgh, 2004). As a social engineer would usually employ deceptive or manipulative
methods the ‘central route to persuasion’ is not really an option and hence mostly uses the
later method. There are people who knowingly reveal personal information in spite of the
awareness of the inherent risks involved (Calluzzo & Cante, 2004; Straub & Nance, 1990).
This is primarily seen in the cases where the human emotion evoked is that of greed, for
example, downloading ‘browser-codec’ from unknown sources in order to watch a video
online, filling in details of personal information in order to receive a free gift etc., There are
also many examples that elicit the exploitation of the human fear factor for example, privates
(lowest ranking officials) admitting to allowing unauthorized entry of higher ranking
professionals (Thornburgh, 2004) due to the fear of reprisals etc.

3.0 Impact of social engineering attacks
Every social engineering attack is usually associated with an end goal. The goal can be
anything from critical issues like getting administrative access of the company’s network to
less critical issues like taking a self-guided tour of the premises etc., and often the attacker
has to deploy an attack plan at various nodes of the chain en route to the goal. Every instance
of an attacker getting what he or she wants through social engineering means can be
considered to be a successful attempt even though the significance of the information
obtained might not be immense (Thornburgh, 2004). It is often the cumulative effect of the
success of many such attacks that the attacker is ultimately after. Social engineering
techniques hence are considered to be a means to an end and not necessarily a one step attack.
Over the recent years there has been a lot of focus on building new and improving existing
countermeasures for the orthodox technical attacks. Innovations in security technologies such
as anti-viruses, intrusion detection systems (IDS), firewalls and patch management systems
have all been able to achieve a substantial mitigating effect on the prevalence of technical

attacks (Twitchell, 2006). As a result, more attackers are employing social engineering
methods by targeting the human elements and often combine such techniques with their
traditional technical methods. A successful social engineering attack can hence simply nullify
the effect of the millions of dollars invested in the security architecture of the organization
(Manske, 2000).

4.0 Social Engineering Attack Methods
There are many types of Social Engineering attacks and the variety and scope of such attacks
are only limited to the imagination and creativity of the attacker (Manske, 2000).
Traditionally, social engineering is largely divided into two categories (1) Human-based
social engineering and (2) Technology based social engineering (Aiello, 2007; Damle, 2002;
Gulati, 2003).
With regards to the field of information systems, the ultimate goal of a social engineer is to
gain direct access to a company’s information either physically or digitally through access of
its information systems (Thornburgh, 2004). Unlike traditional hacking methods, where the
attacker needs to be technically equipped to carry out an attack, a social engineer needs to
focus on his social skills in order to carry out a successful attack. Bhagyavati mentions that
there are usually three major phases of a typical social engineering attack (Bhagyavati, 2007).
1. Preparation phase
2. Attack phase
3. Post attack phase

Fig1: The anatomy of a Social Engineering attack.

Kevin Mitnick (Mitnick & Simon, 2003) also describes the ‘Social Engineering Cycle’
having four distinct stages which are research, developing rapport or trust, exploiting trust
and utilizing trust.
The aim of this paper as mentioned before is to provide a taxonomy that gives a good
overview of the different types of social engineering attacks and hence we concentrate only
on the attack phase as we believe that the other two, preparation and post attack, are generic
phases required for any type of attack. There are many sources that quote shoulder surfing,
dumpster diving as types social engineering attacks (Granger, 2001; Manske, 2000).
Although they help attackers in gathering intelligence in the preparation phase, they do not
involve any form social interaction with the victim, which is a basic need to be categorized as

a social engineering attack. Hence we do not classify them as social engineering attack
methods as part of our taxonomy.

5.0 Taxonomy for Social Engineering
5.1 Person-Person
The type of attacks that can be categorized as Person-Person social engineering are typically
the ones that involve direct or in person interaction of the attacker with the victim where the
attacker uses deceptive methods to take advantage of the victim’s ignorance or his
behavioural weakness and exploits the trust (Kamal & Crews, 2008).
5.1.1 Impersonation
Impersonation is arguably one of the most valued techniques that a social engineer can use as
it can be carried out with little preparation and has the advantage of not revealing real
identities (Redmon, 2005).
5.1.1.1 Pretexting
One of the popular impersonation techniques is called pretexting, which is the practice of
obtaining information under false pretense. It is often more than a simple lie as it involves a
lot of research on the victim before carrying out the attack. One of the widely quoted cases of
pretexting is the HP scandal case where security experts used this method on the board
members of the company to investigate the trail of a data leak of the company’s strategy
(Baer), 2008). The investigators impersonated as the board members themselves in order to
get access to the phone records. This created quite a stir in the media and eventually led way
to birth of a new law (Menn, 2010) that prohibits the use of such techniques for obtaining any
information under false pretense, including the use of fraudulent statements or impersonation.
5.1.1.2 Reverse Social Engineering
The attacker presents himself as a person in a perceived position of authority which
influences the victim to ask more questions instead of the attacker. The orchestration of such
an attack usually spans three stages which are sabotage, advertising and assisting (Granger,
2001). For example, the attacker firsts sabotages the network of the organization, then
advertises himself as a right person with a solution and with a bit of assistance from the
victim fixes the problem. In the last stage he gets what he really needs by requesting the
victim to log into the network under the aforementioned pretext. Such attacks are highly
effective as it leaves the victim with a sense of satisfaction as the network problem goes away
and hence leaves no reason for suspicion. This type of an attack is also termed as Quid pro
quo where the attacker provides some incentive that persuades the victim to divulge
information that otherwise would not be shared.
5.1.1.3 Tailgating
Tailgating simply means following a person with authorized entry into a secure area,
basically riding on coattails (Long, 2008). The act may be considered to be legal or illegal
depending on the circumstance but in general this term has a negative connotation and is used
to describe an illegal act.
The common denominator for all the above mentioned attacks is that the attacker builds a
character and then fabricates a misleading story around this character which is aimed at
evoking the victim’s basic human emotions of greed, sympathy or fear (Workman, 2008).
The attacker must be able to simply anticipate and prepare for questions that might be asked

by the victim. In order to facilitate this and to further project credibility to the story, the
attacker usually uses two tools (1) using the company lingo in the story and (2) portrays
knowledge personnel and policy (Thompson, 2006). A typical story involves a character and
a context which the attacker uses as a vector. The character can either be a fake one
originating from a figment of the attacker’s imagination or a real character that the attacker
wishes to masquerade as. These types of attacks are increasingly becoming easier to
orchestrate with the help of public databases such as LinkedIn & XING, which give the
attacker organizational structure along with names of individuals and the positions they
occupy (Huber, 2009; Roßling & Muller, 2009). To gain a broader understanding of such
person-person attacks we categorize them into two broad categories (1) Impersonating by
building a fake persona & (2) Impersonating a real persona. These two categories should
include all case scenarios discussed above like pretexting, reverse social engineering or quid
pro quo. One thing to observe here is that the conceptual aspects of these methods are not
necessarily used as attack vectors only for person-person scenarios but could be also be used
via other media as well as discussed below.

5.2 Person-Person via media
All attack vectors which do not involve the physical presence of the attacker are categorized
as the Person-Person via media attacks. The ubiquitous use of computers and mobile phones
has helped the social engineering attackers gain more viable and scalable options for carrying
out their attacks. The use of media as an attack vector often has more advantages than the in
person attacks as it simultaneously gives the attacker the power of anonymity and scalability.
Text, voice and video are the three types of media that are taken into consideration for the
taxonomy.
5.2.1 Person-Person via Text
This category includes all types of attacks that use text as a medium for communication.
Examples are activities that are involved with the Internet like email, browsing, chatting and
social networking to short messaging services (SMS) or even traditional offline media like
mail and news papers. The various types of attacks under this category are discussed below.
5.2.1.1 Phishing
Phishing is a fraudulent process of acquiring sensitive and personal information by
masquerading as a trustworthy entity and is mostly carried out over email. Over the years this
problem has not only grown in size but also in complexity (Lee, Choi, & Kim, 2007).
Typically, the attacker generates hundreds of random email addresses and sends a blanket
email to all of them hoping that at least a small percentage of the potential victims will take
the ‘bait’. The nature of the ‘bait’ involves a realistic looking message with a fraudulent callto-action and a website that the attacker uses to collect the victim’s information. This is a
type of attack where the attacker is deceptively influencing the victim and persuading him to
divulge sensitive information.
5.2.1.2 SMSishing
This form of attack though not prevalent yet, can be an effective tool for a social engineer
especially due to the explosion in the use of cellular phones. The anatomy of this type of an
attack is very similar in nature to the concept of phishing but is different in that the fraudulent
message, instead of being sent as an email, is sent as a SMS to the victim’s cellular device
(Binay, 2009).

5.2.1.3 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
This is a type of attack where the attacker tricks the victim’s browser into performing
undesired actions on behalf of the victim (OWASP). The vulnerability exploited here is the
browser’s functionality of not being able to distinguish between user generated requests and
malicious requests especially when the victim is already logged into a website. But the
instantiation of such attacks is by sending an email to the victim that looks legitimate but
carries a malicious code in the form of any common HTML element like an image tag, script
tag etc., As soon the victim opens the email, the browser executes the HTML elements
without any form of verification as it thinks the user is still logged in. This form of an attack
is also called as Session Riding.
5.2.1.4 Malware
This attack is probably the most effective and hence most successful of all types of social
engineering attacks due to its pervasive and persistent nature. This attack vector is a
combination of both psychological and technical ploys and usually feeds on unsuspecting
average users, a number that runs in thousands (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010). As the
technology that thwarts malware has evolved so has the complexity of the malware attacks
primarily due to the reason that the psychological tactics of the attackers also evolved.
Another reason this attack is so successful is because there are so many forms and platforms
that the attacker can use to unleash these attacks. Today the word personal computers has
taken a whole new meaning with different form factors available like smart phones and
tabloids, all of them having the ability to connect to the web and hence all them being viable
avenues for attack.
Whatever device and platform used the reason the problem of malware has been so persistent
is because the attacker is using his social skills in trying to persuade the victim in order to
perform an action that benefits him. The tactics employed as discussed above can be anything
that the victim could connect to like curiosity, fear or greed. The following are examples of
such attacks and the tactics involved that make them successful.
Email:
This is the most prevalent form to launch a malware attack primarily due to the ubiquity of
the application, it is reported that by 2013 approximately 1.9 billion people will be using
emails as their primary form of communication (Reardon, 2009). The tactics used here to
persuade the user to perform an action mentioned in the email could be by eliciting the
victim’s curiosity by using catchy and intriguing lines that make the victim open the email.
The ‘Lovebug’ worm in 2000 is a great example of this, where the attacker’s email had the
subject line ‘ILOVEYOU’ and an attachment that looked like a text file which made the
unsuspecting and curious open the attachment only to be infected with a script that sent a
copy of itself and everyone in the address book on behalf of the victim.
Popups:
Popups are random alerts messages that open in a new window and are usually used as means
for online advertising. The attackers use this form of attack to present messages that elicit the
victim’s fear or greed quotient that will eventually persuade them to perform the intended call
for action. The recent examples include the emergence of ‘scareware’ where popups appear
that contain a fake message stating that victim’s computer has been detected with a virus and
that the user has to download a particular anti-virus to remove it (FBI, 2010). The typical user
panics and downloads the software with the intent to fix his computer but in doing so
inadvertently infects his computer with malware carried in the software.

Search Engine poisoning:
Search engine poisoning (SEP) occurs when the attacker lures people to his website by
employing certain ‘black hat’ or unethical techniques. When the unsuspecting user clicks on
the search engine result, because he deems it to be relevant to his query, he is redirected to
another website that tries to persuade the user to download a certain malware.
A typical attack of this form usually kick-starts when there is a significant global event. Tools
like Google trends are used to monitor such phenomena and whenever a particular keyword is
found to be trending, the attackers build fake websites seeded with malware and expose it to
the internet (Townsend, 2010). The social engineering angle for this form of an attack is in
the fact that the attacker is exploiting the trust that users have in the search results provided
by the search engines to launch the malware attack. SEP is becoming increasingly popular as
it doesn’t even need to elicit the human emotions required for a typical social engineering
attack as it is already created through the occurrence of the global events.
Social networking:
Attack methods using social networking software is also on the rise purely due to the ubiquity
of such platforms. Recently Facebook reported to have acquired its 500 millionth user
(approximately 8.5% of the world’s population) and there many such applications that are
growing in popularity providing another juicy avenue for the attackers to exploit. Twitter, a
popular social networking site has been a subject of numerous social engineering attacks. A
typical attack is where the attacker creates a fake profile that has a message and a link which
is a shortened form of a full URL, using services like tinyurl.com. The victims are persuaded
to click on the link which downloads the malware without permission (Naraine, 2008).
Again, the Social engineering angle here is in the fact that the victim’s trust is exploited
when he is asked to click on a disguised and shortened form of a malicious URL containing
malware from a trusted source in his social network.

5.2.2 Person-Person via Voice
All types of attacks which do not have the attacker’s physical presence but use voice as a
medium for communication could be slotted into this category. These include the use of both
the cellular network where the attacker carries out the attack over cell phones and also the
Internet where the attacker can choose to carry his attack leveraging IP-based voice
messaging technologies like VOIP. The various types of attacks under this category are
discussed below.
5.2.2.1 Vishing
Vishing is the practice of using the cellular network or VOIP into providing personal,
financial and other sensitive information for personal benefit (Ollmann, 2007). The attack is
analogous to phishing and SMSishing as discussed before but is different in that it is carried
out over the phone using voice as a medium. A typical vishing attack is when a victim gets a
phone call with a pre-recorded message asking the victim to call back to verify credibility of
bank details. When the victim calls the bank an IVR system is set up giving a number of
options for the victim to choose. Regardless of what option the victim chooses, they will hear
a message that asks them to authenticate themselves by dialling in their account and pin
number. Once the information is provided the call is either terminated or redirected to the real
customer service leaving the victim in a state of panic.

5.2.3 Person-Person via Video
These types of attacks are the ones where the attacker may use video as a medium for
communication to orchestrate social engineering attacks. The explosive growth in the use of
internet and increasing broadband penetration around the world has been responsible for the
success of websites like YouTube that allow people to share knowledge and communicate
through videos. A typical attack of this kind could involve circulating a video claiming to be
a ‘tutorial’ of sorts with a set of instructions to a pre-created problem created by the attacker.
If an unsuspecting victim who is affected by the pre-created problem comes across this video
online, he or she will willingly follow the instructions and fall prey to the set trap. This type
of an attack is quite similar to the reverse engineering technique discussed earlier where the
attacker lures the victim by claiming that he has a solution to a pre-created problem. Though
there are no reports of such attacks in the media yet this is a definite viable avenue for the
hackers to exploit given the number of people who are watching and sharing videos online
today.
6.0 Countermeasures for Social Engineering
The most basic definition of social engineering is hacking the human brain. Regardless of the
technological advances in the security field this form of attack will be persistent as it is
difficult to upgrade or patch human brains as we can to technology (Townsend, 2010). The
best strategy is to engage in activities that raise the awareness levels of such attacks through
education. A multi layered strategy that implements training to increase awareness and
enforces policies like ‘need-to-know’ access should be employed by organizations to mitigate
the effect of these attacks. Social engineering is a game and hence the goal should be to make
things difficult for the attacker and reduce or better remove the fun element so that the
attacker moves on to a different target.
7.0 Conclusion:
In this paper we tried to bring some clarity to the different types of social engineering attacks
through our taxonomy approach. We hope that this taxonomy will be useful to organizations
to understand the attack vectors better and consequently be useful in building robust and
effective countermeasures for the threats they impose. There definitely is a conscience that
this taxonomy may not be complete yet in its entirety and hence we welcome any suggestions
from the academic community to suggest any edits. The social methods employed to get
around technological countermeasures is a dynamic process where the motivated attacker will
always try to up the ante against the victim. As such, we will be documenting these changes
and will constantly iterate our taxonomy to make it current.
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